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Bankruptcy Law in European
Countries Emerging from
Communism: The Special Legal and
Economic Challenges
by
The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford*
Ironically, one virtue of a market economy is that a business
can fail. The strength of a private enterprise system in produc-
ing and delivering goods and services depends upon the survival
of only efficient businesses.... Iff a private business' product
is unwanted or its methods of production are inefficient, the
business should ultimately die.'
Bankruptcy 2 law is developing rapidly in the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE) that have recently escaped the domination of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). The communist governments
fell in those countries that were separate from the USSR in 1989,3 and those
countries that were a part of the USSR gained their independence and ac-
quired new non-communist governments in 1989 (the Baltic states) and 1991
(Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Russia).4 While many other areas of law
*United States Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California. Copyright 1996. All rights reserved.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the court or of
the United States Government.
'Julia M. Metzger & Samuel L. Bufford, Exporting United States Bankruptcy Law: The Hungarian
Experience, 21 CAL. BA'N", J. 153, 153 (1993).
2 Bankruptcy" is a word whose meaning varies around the world, and even in Central Europe. In the
United States, it refers to the federal law providing for the reorganization or liquidation of the financial
affairs of businesses and individuals. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994). In Romania, it refers to the
liquidation of businesses and merchants, but not to reorganizations. In Hungary, in contrast, it refers to
the reorganization of businesses, but not their liquidation. Yet another meaning is found in Australia,
where it refers to the liquidation of the assets of individuals, but not of business entities. In this Article, as
in the United States, the term indudes all insolvency proceedings, whether the goal is liquidation or
reorganization.
3It should be noted that the sweep of communists from power in the CEE countries was not complete.
While there was a change in government leadership, most of the lower government officials, many of
whom had been Communist Party members, remained in place. Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise: a
complete removal of all communists from the government of one of these countries would have left it
largely without a government altogether, and likely would have led to anarchy.
4Most of the government officials who came into office in the countries newly separated from the
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that are basic to the development of a market economy need substantial de-
velopment or revision, bankruptcy law is leading the way, for the most part,
in all of these countries.5
However, the legal structures and economic conditions in the CEE coun-
tries are quite different from those in the United States and, in consequence,
pose unique problems for the application of bankruptcy law. The most im-
portant difference is the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises,
in which bankruptcy law has a unique and important role. This Article ex-
plores those legal structures and economic conditions and discusses their im-
plication for bankruptcy law in these countries.
This Article is based principally on what I have learned from my experi-
ence teaching seminars on bankruptcy law (and other subjects) in the CEE
countries, and in advising various government officials on bankruptcy law and
other commercial law.6 It also draws to a certain extent on conversations
with colleagues who have taught seminars similar to those that I have taught
in the region.7
I. BACKGROUND
Before launching into the factors impacting on bankruptcy law in the
CEE countries, it is necessary to pause to detail the countries involved, and
to discuss briefly the legal framework needed for a market economy and the
rapid development of bankruptcy law in the CEE countries.
USSR were former regional officials in the USSR government, and were former Communist Party mem-
bers. The continuation in office of these officials was necessary for the reasons stated supra note 3.
5Development of civil codes, in those countries that lacked such codes, is following fairly closely the
development of bankruptcy laws. Other kinds of laws to support a market economy are lagging substan-
tially behind.
'In Romania, I taught two week-long seminars for judges and a week of programs for Romanian bank-
ers in 1996, sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); a two-day
program on bankruptcy law for all government officials in 1995, also sponsored by USAID; a week-long
seminar for government officials and judges in 1994, sponsored by the Central and East European Law
Initiative of the American Bar Association and the Romanian Council for Coordination, Strategy and
Economic Reform; and a week-long seminar for judges under the Rule of Law Program of the United
States Information Agency (funded by USAID) in 1991. Each of the Romanian programs was also co-
sponsored by the Romanian Ministry of Justice.
In Ukraine, I taught a two-day program on bankruptcy law, including a day devoted to meeting with
judges, in 1996; I spent a week in 1995 advising a drafting committee of University of Kyiv law professors
drafting revisions to the Ukrainian bankruptcy law; and spent another week in Kyiv in June, 1995, with a
team of fifteen American lawyers working on the entire range of laws necessary to support a market
economy.
In 1993, I taught a week-long seminar in Budapest co-sponsored by the International Training Center
for Bankers and the International Law Institute.
7USAID contracted with Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. to present more than twenty week-long seminars
for judges in ten countries in the region. Each program was taught by two United States bankruptcy
judges and one or two accountants.
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A. THE COUNTRIES
The CEE countries that serve as a focus for this Article divide into four
groups.8 The first group consists in those countries west of the former
USSR, which were never formally a part of the USSR, but came under So-
viet domination shortly after World War II. These countries constitute a tier
from Poland in the north to Bulgaria in the south, and include the Czech
Republic,9 Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania (Central European countries).
The communist governments in these countries all fell in 1989.10
The second group of countries consists in those that were part of the
USSR since its foundation in 1922,11 and which gained their independence in
1991, after the aborted military coup in Moscow in August of that year.
12
This group includes Ukraine, 13 Belarus, 14 and Russia [NIS countries (newly
independent states of the former Soviet Union)].
The third group of countries consists in those countries, not part of the
USSR until 1940, which were taken over and incorporated into the USSR in
that year.' 5 This group includes the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania,
and Estonia) and Moldova (which the USSR sliced off from Romania). The
Baltic countries gained their independence from the USSR in 1989,16 and
Moldova gained its independence a week after the collapse of the Moscow
coup in August, 1991.17 The Baltic countries have the legal and economic
SOne former Central European country, the Democratic Republic of Germany (commonly called East
Germany in the United States), is not included in this analysis. Its situation is unique: it alone has joined a
Western country (the Federal Republic of Germany, the union of which is now simply known as Ger-
many), and received special economic, legal, and political considerations that no other nation in the region
has enjoyed.
9The Czech Republic and Slovakia were the single country of Czechoslovakia, from its formation out
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 until their consensual separation into two countries at the begin-
ning of 1993.
'0E-AsTh EuRoPE .AND THE Commo~wALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 1994 [hereinafter EECIS
1994] 468 (Poland), 199 (Bulgaria), 254 (Czech Republic), 605 (Slovakia), 329 (Hungary), 504 (Romania)
(2d ed. 1994).
"t The USSR was proclaimed on December 30, 1922, and included Russia, Byelorussia (Belarus),
Ukraine, and Transcaucasia. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 20 TrIE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA
37 (1993).
12EECIS 1994, supra note 10, at 548.
13Most of Ukraine was part of Russia from 1654 to 1917. It became an independent country in 1917,
and it joined the USSR in 1922. Id. at 677-80.
14Belarus (Byelorussia) became a part of the USSR in 1922. Id. at 166.
"Id. at 287 (Estonia), 398 (Latvia), 415 (Lithuania), 450 (Moldova).
161d. at 287, 398, 415, 450.
171 was in Romania during the Moscow coup in August, 1991, and during the time when Moldova
declared its independence a week later. Our seminar group of six American judges, several Romanian
Ministry of Justice officials, and several translators was traveling between Romanian cities on the day of
the independence vote in the Moldovan parliament. The roll call vote in the 450-member parliament was
carried live on Romanian radio, and lasted more than two hours. (Romanian is the official language of
Moldova). It was a moving event, which was all the more poignant because, only a week earlier, the hard-
won freedom from communism stood in great peril. Indeed, on the day of the coup a Romanian Supreme
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traditions of the Central European countries, and are proceeding on a parallel
course. Thus, this Article treats them together with the Central European
countries. Moldova,'8 in contrast, is making no effort to retrieve its
Romanian historical traditions, and is proceeding on a development track par-
allel to the countries in the second group: it is thus treated with the NIS
group.
The fourth group of countries is the Balkans, and includes Albania and
the pieces of the former Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, and
Bosnia-Herzegovina). Yugoslavia was controlled by a communist government
after World War II, but was not under the domination of the USSR. The
Balkans have had a troubled history, and their progress toward a Western
style legal system and market economy is different from the other CEE coun-
tries. Albania has suffered from self-imposed exile from the entire European
community (both East and West) and is centuries behind in development.
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia have been preoccupied with an ethnic war
since the fall of communism. Croatia is emerging from the war, and is at-
tempting to join Slovenia and Macedonia in their move towards the Euro-
pean mainstream. Because of the unique situations in the Balkan countries,
they are a secondary focus of this Article.
This Article examines the specific legal and economic conditions and chal-
lenges that are largely shared by the countries in the CEE region that differ
dramatically from those in the United States, insofar as they impact on bank-
ruptcy law. An analysis of the bankruptcy laws of the CEE countries as such
is beyond the scope of this Article,19 and is left for another occasion.20
B. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR A MARKET ECONOMY
A market economy needs a legal framework to provide for the rights of
the participants and a structure in which transactions can take place. It also
Court Justice invited me to coffee, and started the conversation by saying, "Well, freedom is over for us,
and I will not see it again in my lifetime."
"SMoldova was part of Romania before its incorporation into the USSR in 1940, and shared the
statutes and legal traditions that Romania still has. However, Moldova is not utilizing those statutes and
traditions, and instead is starting from the beginning in drafting laws to permit its economy to function as
a market economy. Thus, its state of progress and its approach to resolution of the transition problems
more resembles that of Ukraine and Russia than that of Romania.
'9A modern insolvency law in a market economy should accomplish four main purposes: (1) provide for
the equitable and predictable treatment of creditors; (2) maximize asset recovery; (3) provide practical
opportunities for reorganization in an appropriate case where creditor interests and social needs are better
met by maintaining the debtor in operation than by liquidating it; and (4) give the honest debtor an
opportunity for a fresh economic start after financial failure. Henry N. Schiffman, Financial Transactions
for Lawyers, Introduction to ION TURCU, REORGANIZAREA i LIcHmAREA JUDicAx.A 5, 6 (1996). The
bankruptcy laws of the CEE countries show varying degrees of meeting this standard.
20Pursuant to the USAID project described supra note 7, Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. has recently
completed a report on bankruptcy in the CEE countries. DELorr'E & ToucHe, LLP, BANouwprcy AND
RESTRUCTURNG CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE (on file with the author) (D&T REPORT).
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needs effective governmental fiscal policies, and the development of financial
and intermediation institutions. The development of such a legal framework
is a principal building block for a sustainable market economy in the CEE
region.2
1
In the CEE countries the paramount civil law is the civil code, which in
some countries includes an associated commercial code.2 2 In addition to these
codes, a market economy typically requires a system of laws that includes













As the foregoing list indicates, bankruptcy law is only one of a dozen
kinds of legal structures needed for a market economy. However, to a large
extent, bankruptcy law is leading the way in the development of the commer-
cial law. This has resulted because of bankruptcy law's strong ties to priva-
tization as a first step in developing a market economy in a market where
many businesses are insolvent.
C. THE RAPiD DEVELOPMENT OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN THE CEE
COUNTRIES
New bankruptcy laws have gone into force since 1990 in all of the coun-
tries in the CEE region except Poland, and further bankruptcy laws are pend-
ing in a number of the countries. The reasons for the rapid development of
bankruptcy law in the CEE countries merit a separate study. For the pur-
poses of this Article, the discussion is limited to a few salient points. Some of
these points are developed below, in the discussion of the legal and economic
structures that impact the application of bankruptcy law.
"1See Patricia Shapiro, Development of a Commercial Law Strategy for ENI Countries (unpublished
USAID manuscript, undated, on file with the author).
2 The two dominant models for civil codes are the French and the German models. Germany has both
a civil code and a commercial code, while France puts all of the private law provisions in a single civil code.
Whether a country has a separate commercial code largely turns on whether it follows the French or the
German model. See infra text accompanying notes 70-82.2 j. Shapiro, supra note 21, at 3.
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There are several reasons why bankruptcy law is leading the way for
commercial law development in the CEE countries. Perhaps the most impor-
tant reason that the CEE countries are interested in bankruptcy law, and
especially in the law providing for the reorganization of insolvent business
entities, is that bankruptcy is perceived as part of the structure needed to
provide for the privatization of state-owned enterprises, which constitute a
very large segment of the economies in each of these countries. Privatization
is still in its initial stages in most of the CEE countries. 24
A second group of reasons for the leading position of bankruptcy law
arises from its status in the internal legal structure of the CEE countries (and,
indeed, of any country). Bankruptcy law is very technical, and the interrela-
tions between the legal provisions and the economic effects are complex.
Thus, few politicians understand it, in part because few elected officials in
the CEE region are attorneys.25 At the same time, and partially in conse-
quence of its technical complications, bankruptcy tends to be a politically
neutral issue (until it is applied to state-owned enterprises), on which the
various political factions that exist in each CEE country are not likely to take
opposing positions. In addition, bankruptcy is a system of law that has no
existing vested interests of substantial consequence in the CEE countries, so
that changing the bankruptcy law does not step on very many toes of sub-
stantial players in the present legal or economic structure. Furthermore,
bankruptcy law can be revised without revising other bodies of law, and for
the most part without creating new institutions to administer it. Bankruptcy
law reform can be accomplished without a substantial contribution from the
public fisc. For the Central European countries, revision of bankruptcy law
is made easier by the fact that bankruptcy law has existed there for many
years (but has lain dormant), so that its revision is not viewed as a major
change in the legal structure.
At the same time, there are substantial international pressures on the
CEE countries to institute reform in their bankruptcy laws. The interna-
tional lending institutions, principally the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), have pushed strongly for bankruptcy law reform, and
have sometimes even made it a condition of qualifying for international lend-
ing. For example, in 1994, the IMF imposed on Romania a requirement of
legal reform in four areas as a condition of qualifying for further IMF lending.
One of these areas was bankruptcy law.26 Romania immediately scheduled
bankruptcy law as the first area for revision because the Ministry of Justice
2 4For a further discussion of the role of bankruptcy in the privatization effort, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 38-41.
2 For example, there are approximately ten lawyers in the 300-member parliament in Poland.
2 6Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J.
Comp. L. 93, 112 n. 56 (1995).
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had already drafted a revised bankruptcy law and had scheduled a week-long
seminar on bankruptcy law under the sponsorship of the American Bar
Association. 27
Furthermore, the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) 28 has sponsored a substantial program throughout the CEE region
on bankruptcy law development. This program included a large segment
designed to teach local judges how to administer bankruptcy cases, and in
particular to teach them what they need to know about accounting and busi-
ness standards and practices to make the judicial decisions necessary for busi-
ness reorganizations.
29
One should not infer, from the development of bankruptcy statutes in the
CEE region, that bankruptcy practice is well developed in these countries.
30
For the most part, bankruptcy cases are just beginning to be filed in the
region, and most are involuntary cases. Financial responsibility for the insol-
vency of state-owned enterprises is difficult to apportion.3' There are insuffi-
cient incentives in the market place or the legal system to force unprofitable
businesses into bankruptcy, either voluntarily or involuntarily.32 Such incen-
tives need to be developed: if financial failure is not a credible threat, manag-
ers will not pay due attention to the short-term liquidity of their businesses,
or to their long-term profitability.3
3
II. THE NEED FOR REORGANIZATION INSTEAD OF
LIQUIDATION
The reorganization of insolvent enterprises, much more than liquidation,
is needed in the CEE countries. This is much more true for the large enter-
prises, which are (or recently have been) state-owned. This need arises from
the closely related needs in the CEE countries to privatize these enterprises,
2' 7The author was one of the leaders of this seminar. See supra note 6.
28USAID administers approximately one-third of the United States foreign aid budget.
"9The USAID program arose from a grant to Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. in the fall of 1993. It included
three phases: first, a description of the existing bankruptcy law in each of ten countries (Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia); second, a
presentation in each country of a summary of that nation's standing in bankruptcy law development in the
region; and third, a presentation of week-long judicial training seminars to small groups of judges (twenty
to twentyfive judges) in each country. The instructors were two United States bankruptcy judges for
each seminar, plus one or two accountants from Deloitte & Touche. A total of twelve United States
bankruptcy judges participated in this program, including the author of this Article. Ukraine was added
to this list of countries in 1996, and the second and third phases of the program are still pending for that
country. See D&T REPORT, supra note 20.301d.
3'KALmAN MzrFj, BANKRUPTCY AND THE POST-CommuNIST ECONOMIES OF EAST CENTRAL Eu.
ROPE 6 (1993).
32In Poland, creditor passivity results partly from the banks' efforts to cover their bad assets. Id. at 16.
3Id. at 5.
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and at the same time to resolve the insolvency problems in many of these
enterprises.
The economic objectives of bankruptcy reorganization are largely the
same as for liquidation. For individual entrepreneurs, bankruptcy provides a
"fresh start," free of an unmanageable load of prior debt. At the same time, on
the creditor side, it provides for the equality of treatment among creditors.
Both types of bankruptcy procedure are designed to ensure the highest and
best use of commercial assets following failure of a business. In addition, reor-
ganization is designed to permit the restructuring of a business so that its
healthy components can survive, even if other aspects must be jettisoned. In
addition, reorganization is designed to preserve the going concern value of a
business that is worth more as an operating unit than as dismembered parts.
A. THE RESULTS OF LIQUIDATION
Consider what liquidation accomplishes in a largely government-owned
economy. Most of the creditors are government-owned institutions. In
Romania, for example, ninety percent of the economy belongs to formerly
state-owned industries, and seventy percent of their debts are owed to the
government.34 The most common mode of liquidation is to sell the assets and
to distribute the proceeds to the creditors, which are government entities.
This works admirably if the assets can be sold into the private sector.35
However, the lack of markets for assets makes it impossible to sell assets
into the private sector to a large extent. The private sector lacks the liquid-
ity to absorb the assets, even if markets can be found, in most of the CEE
countries. Thus the assets themselves, or ownership interests in them (e.g.,
shares of stock), must be distributed to the creditors. However, what this
accomplishes is to transfer the assets back to the government, the reverse of
privatization. Thus, liquidation has a substantial likelihood of producing a
reversal of privatization, returning assets to public ownership that the priva-
tization project is trying to take out of public ownership. Some other method
for restructuring businesses must be found.
This is where reorganization of businesses under the model of Chapter 11
of the United States Bankruptcy Code has appeal. A reorganization, as op-
posed to a liquidation, makes it possible to keep the assets in the private
sector, and to limit government participation to holding debt in the reorga-
nized debtor. In this manner, privatization is not jeopardized by the restruc-
turing of insolvent businesses.
In addition, reorganization is a way to deal with the lack of markets for
34Honorable Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy Law and Wrong About Its Critics,
72 WAsFL U. L.Q. 829, 843 (1994).
3"See infra text accompanying note 53.
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assets, particularly assets constituting large business enterprises. If the assets
are not sold in a reorganization, a market does not have to be found for them.
Instead, the reorganization may provide that the assets may remain in the
business, and it may rearrange the ownership and debt interests. With suita-
ble changes in the debtor's operations to eliminate operating losses, the busi-
ness is able to return to profitability and continue in operation, without
needing to sell all the assets in an illiquid or nonexistent market.
Furthermore, the liquidation of any substantial quantity of the insolvent
business enterprises in the CEE region is not a viable alternative, because
they would be too much for the economy to absorb.36 Thus, it should be the
policy of the law in the CEE region to favor reorganizations.
Because United States bankruptcy law provides the dominant model for
bankruptcy reorganization, many CEE countries are looking to the United
States for the model for reorganization of enterprises under the bankruptcy
system.37
B. ECONOMIC AND STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS
There are several economic factors that make it much more important to
emphasize reorganization in the CEE countries than in the Western world.
These factors differ from those found in the United States and Western Eu-
rope, and have a substantial impact on the possibility of bankruptcy liquida-
tion in the CEE region. These factors include the largely unprivatized status
of the economy, the insolvency of a substantial portion of business enter-
prises, the lack of markets for selling assets in bankruptcy cases, the lack of
commercial credit for financing businesses, and a much different competitive
environment from that known in the Western world.
1. Privatization
In most CEE countries, there was little private ownership of business
during the communist era. Shortly after communist governments came to
power in these countries, virtually all privately-owned businesses were na-
tionalized, and remained state-owned until the end of the communist era.
Privatization 38 is the most important step in the development of market
economies in the CEE countries: it must be accomplished to a substantial
extent before a market economy can function. Since the fall of communism in
the CEE countries, every country has committed to returning most of its
businesses to the private sector. However, privatization has moved quite
36Schiffiman, supra note 19, at 15 n. 1; MIZSEI, supra note 31, at 3. Smaller businesses, in contrast, may
be liquidated if they cannot operate profitably and cannot be- reasonably reorganized.
371n fact, there are countries, such as Poland, where reorganizations are being carried out under a
bankruptcy law that principally provides for liquidation.
3 8For an analysis of the function of privatization, see Irene A. Belot, Comment, The Role of the IMF
and the World Bank in Rebuilding the CIS, 9 TmPe. Ibr1'L & CoMP. L.J. 83, 88-90 (1995).
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slowly in many countries. Indeed, in some of the countries it has hardly
begun. Most larger businesses in the CEE countries are still state-owned.
The nationalization of private enterprises in the CEE countries was not
limited to the state's acquisition of ownership of shares of stock. Because all
industry was state-owned, industrial investment frequently was not identi-
fied with a specific enterprise, because there was no need to do so. In conse-
quence, it is frequently difficult to determine what specific business assets
belong to a particular business. 39 This problem is solved by the "corporatiza-
tion" of enterprises, or the formation of new state-owned corporations and
the transfer to them of specific assets. Corporatization is in substantial pro-
gress in many of the CEE countries. These new corporations are then ready
to be privatized, if they are sufficiently solvent or their finances can be
restructured.
The next step in privatization of enterprises, whether after corporatiza-
tion or by sale of assets, has not progressed very far in most of the CEE
countries. While most of the countries have a substantial number of pri-
vately-owned businesses, most of these are small businesses that have begun
in the last several years since the fall of communism. The large state-owned
enterprises that existed during the communist era continue under state own-
ership. A number of them have not been corporatized, and are simply arms
of the state. Most of the CEE countries have a specific state property agency
that functions as the shareholder for the businesses that have been corpora-
tized. However, state property agencies do not function like typical share-
holders, and usually are unwilling to replace management when it does not
act to maximize the profits of the shareholders.
Bankruptcy itself can be used as a privatization tool.4° A state-owned
enterprise can be put into bankruptcy, and then the assets (or the shares of
stock) are sold into the private sector. Privatization by this means is occur-
ring frequently in Poland and Hungary,41 and is beginning to occur in
39Privatization in Poland: An Interview with Jeffrey Sachs, 15 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 441, 454-55
(1992). A student comment states:
In the former Soviet Union, enterprises did not own property. Property belonged
to the State, and the enterprise was merely a convenient unit for the administration
of the States property. The enterprise was a judicial person and had standing
before a court of law, but it did not own the property and equipment it used.
Under such an arrangement, there could be no race of the creditors because there
were no assets for the creditors to tear away from the debtor. Thus, there was no
need for a system of orderly disposition of debts and assets. Without private prop-
erty rights, there is no need for a bankruptcy system.
Steve Campbell, Comment, Brother, Can You Spare a Ruble? The Development of Bankruptcy Legislation
in the New Russia, 10 BAuNK DEv. J. 343, 350 (1994).
4°Scott Horton, The Death of Communism and Bankruptcy Reorganization, 13 AM. BArsns I.NST. J.
12, 12, 31 (April, 1994).4 1Schffran, supra note 19, at 8.
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Ukraine.
2. Solvency of Businesses
Another dominant feature of the economies in the CEE countries is the
insolvency of a large number of enterprises. A substantial portion of the
businesses in the CEE countries are insolvent, in the balance sheet42 sense
that their liabilities exceed the value of their assets. Even more troubling,
many of the enterprises are regularly operating at a loss. This is especially
true for the large state-owned monopolies. For the most part, these busi-
nesses have no hope of making profits without substantial restructuring.
They may also need a large amount of new capital investment. The extent of
the insolvency problem varies from approximately twenty-five percent of the
economy in Hungary 43 and forty-five percent of the economy in Poland44 to
some ninety percent of the economy in Ukraine.45
One of the most important reasons that CEE economies are dominated by
businesses of questionable solvency is that, for half a century or more, no
business has been allowed to fail.46 The economic landscape in these coun-
tries is densely populated with businesses that would have lost the struggle
for survival in a competitive economy.47 Work forces have become bloated
because businesses operated as bureaucracies, where there were no incentives
for efficiency. In addition, for many years there has been a substantial insuffi-
ciency of capital investment, and equipment and facilities are frequently obso-
lete or in disrepair.
Another factor in the general insolvency of businesses in the CEE region
is the collapse of the COMECON market after the fall of the communist
governments in the region.48 Together with prolonged government austerity
measures and the liberalization of prices and imports, this has caused a drastic
reduction in the profitability of enterprises.49
Because of the enormous extent of insolvency of enterprises in the CEE
countries, the general liquidation of insolvent businesses is not an economic
41The financial statements of many insolvent businesses in the CEE countries do not show their
insolvency because neither United States nor international accounting standards are generally followed in
that region.
4 3MIZsux, supra note 31, at 26.
44Id. at 13.
4 -For example, Victor Yushchenko, Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian National Bank, estimates
that ninety percent of the Ukrainian businesses are insolvent. Opening remarks given at Kiev Conference
on Restructuring and Bankruptcy in Central and Eastern Europe: Ukraine, May 14, 1996.
46 Mzsm, supra note 31, at 9.
47Hungary is a limited exception to this rulez in the 1970s, smaller firms in financial crisis were typi-
cally merged into larger businesses. MizsEI, supra note 31, at 23.
4S1d. at 6, 22.
49jd.
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or political possibility.50 In most of the CEE countries, the liquidation of the
insolvent enterprises would result in the virtual disappearance of the econ-
omy altogether. Restructuring is the only feasible alternative that can be
considered for a substantial portion of the larger business entities.
The restructuring or liquidation of insolvent enterprises is an important
step toward economic reform. Indeed, economic reform is probably not possi-
ble in the CEE countries until the insolvency problem has been resolved.51
The resolution of this problem, furthermore, is likely to contribute substan-
tially to economic decline as the process goes forward5
2
3. Markets
Markets like those that are common in the Western world for many kinds
of assets do not exist in the CEE countries.3 3 Markets are generally available
in the United States for most assets that need to be liquidated. Thus, assets
can usually be sold by a bankruptcy estate at a price approximating their
value in the marketplace. Such markets are much less common in the CEE
countries. For many kinds of assets in the CEE countries, there is no recog-
nized or readily available market.
The lack of markets makes it much more difficult to liquidate assets in the
CEE countries than in the United States. Furthermore, the lack of markets
makes it nearly impossible to value assets to determine whether a plan of
reorganization should be confirmed. Some solution to this problem must be
found to permit reorganizations to proceed.
4. Commercial Credit
Commercial credit is largely unavailable domestically in the CEE coun-
tries, because of the lack of development of a vigorous banking system.
4
Commercial credit in most CEE countries is provided mainly by suppliers,
who are generally state owned (because privatization has not proceeded very
far).5s The banking systems are generally underdeveloped, and there are few
other large sources of commercial credit. Negotiable instruments are not in
use (except letters of credit for international transactions) and are not
understood.
In many CEE countries, small banks quickly sprang up in the early 1990s,
but they were too thinly capitalized. To attract deposits, they offered inter-
est rates so high that they could only pay depositors by, in effect, operating
S°IRAJ HAS, Tim ECONoMICS OF BANKtupTcy, REORGANISATION D LIQUIDATION: LESSONS
FoR EUROPE.AN TRANsrrIoNAL ECONOMmS 21 (1995).
'lId. at 30.
52Id.
53D&T REPORT, supra note 20, at 14-15.
5
4Except for Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia, there was no commercial banking at all in the CEE
region before the fall of communism. MIzsEI, supra note 31, at 29.
"See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
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Ponzi schemes.56 Furthermore, they frequently made loans to insiders and
related businesses at preferential rates,57 and these loans frequently went into
default. Thus, a number of existing banks have their own solvency problems.
In Ukraine, for example, there are a large number of banks, but hyper-
inflation58 has so badly eroded their assets that they are only able to make
small loans, and a typical loan is for no longer than a month. In Romania,
similarly, bank debt accounts for only a small portion of outstanding indebt-
edness. The development of a viable banking system in the CEE countries is
one of the important steps needed for developing a market economy.
An additional economic factor is payment blockage. For a number of
years there has been insufficient cash in the economies of many of the CEE
countries to permit businesses to settle their accounts. Where businesses
were all state-owned, nobody particularly worried about this, so long as cash
was available for payrolls. Suppliers and customers simply recorded book
entries rather than making actual payments. In a market economy, however,
this prevents the marketplace from imposing discipline on businesses. So long
as a substantial portion of the finances of businesses are handled by book
entries, rather than by real payment, businesses are permitted to lose money
without any marketplace impact resulting from their losses. Those businesses
that should be closed or go into bankruptcy because they are losing money
continue to operate indefinitely under such a system.
5. Competitive Environment
The competitive environment in the CEE countries is complicated by
large and inefficient enterprises, obsolete technology, bloated work forces,
59
the disappearance of traditional markets, hyperinflation, a lack of organized
market distribution systems, and the imposition on businesses of governmen-
tal functions through the social assets" of large businesses.
Under communism there was no competition for goods and services, and
businesses had no need to compete in the marketplace. In addition, many
businesses enjoyed monopolies, 60 and none was required to compete for mar-
ket share. Their production requirements were determined annually, and
both their costs and their revenues were determined pursuant to a central
36Honorable Leif l Clark, Learnings from Latvia, 15 AzL BA Nat. INST. J. 36, 36 (June, 1996).
371d.
-8Hyperinflation is generally defined as inflation exceeding fifty percent per month. In 1993, the infla-
tion rate in Ukraine was 4735 percent.
591t was estimated that, at the time of the fall of communism in Poland, half of the work force had jobs
that would not have existed in a market economy. Sikorski, Revolution Betrayed, NAT'L REv., July 23,
1990, at 20, 21.
6See, eg, MIzsE, supra note 31 (citing examples in Poland such as Moda Polska, which had enjoyed a
virtual monopoly in the retail trade of fashion clothing, and which became insolvent because of imports
and domestic competition).
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plan. In addition to obsolete technology, many enterprises had too many
workers. Unemployment was avoided during the communist era by simply
adding positions in enterprises, with little consideration for efficiency. In ad-
dition, the availability of technology was limited, and lagged far behind that
in the Western world. Pollution of the environment was endemic, and in
many places the results have been disastrous. In short, there was nothing
remotely resembling the discipline of a marketplace on either the revenues
generated or the costs incurred by enterprises.
After the fall of communism, this situation has changed to some extent
and in some markets. However, much progress remains to be accomplished in
creating a market economy in the CEE countries. The partial transition re-
sults in a number of features that are distinctive in the CEE countries that
affect the operation of bankruptcy law there.
Businesses tend to have a different structure in the CEE countries from
what is common in Western countries. While the United States' economy
has many smaller businesses that compete with each other and try to find a
market niche, in the planned economies under the communist system there
tended to be a single nationwide business in each market that enjoyed a mo-
nopoly, or at most a handful of businesses that shared a monopoly. For exam-
ple, there was usually a single telephone company, a single automobile
manufacturer, and a single steel company. Furthermore, in the manufacturing
sector a single large factory frequently dominates an entire town, and its
closure would destroy the town's economy altogether.61 Even where these
businesses have been privatized, they still tend to have extremely large mar-
ket shares (if they do not continue to be monopolies), and are not required to
struggle with competitors for survival. The large businesses need to be bro-
ken into parts so that they can compete against each other.
62
"Social assets" constitute another problem for businesses in Central and
Eastern Europe. Large businesses, rather than local governments, tend to
own and operate such facilities as schools, parks, libraries, clinics, canteens,
commissaries, and vacation facilities. The closing of a business would lead to
the closing of these facilities as well, unless an arrangement is made to trans-
fer these functions to a local government. While in principle such a transfer
should be made, the transaction costs are substantial, and frequently a trans-
fer cannot be accomplished where the viability of the principal business in a
town is doubtful. Governments need to take over the essentially governmen-
tal functions of social assets, and the other functions need to be separated
from the business enterprises to stand on their own feet.
61See, e.g., Gerald Seib & Alan Murray, Herculean Task, W AL. ST. J., Oct. 15, 1991, at A16.
62Hungary, for example, divided its retail banking system into a number of independent banks when it
privatized the retail sector of what used to be a single central bank.
(Vol. 70
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
The private sector in the CEE countries tends to be the focus of bank-
ruptcy activity, while the public sector for the most part has not yet been
required to submit to market discipline, and to go into bankruptcy when it
cannot operate profitably. Unlike private business enterprises, when a pub-
licly-owned business runs out of money, the government is much more likely
to bail it out with the cash needed to meet payroll and other financial obliga-
tions. This gives a competitive advantage to the public sector, and businesses
in the private sector thus operate at a competitive disadvantage in the
marketplace.6
3
If the government itself lacks financial resources to bail out favored enter-
prises, it is tempted to print money to meet the shortage. Many of the CEE
countries have done this, and consequently have suffered extreme levels of
inflation. One of the worst examples is Ukraine, where the inflation rate in
1993 was 4735 percent.64
Severe inflation of the sort that has occurred in many CEE countries has
a number of impacts on the economy that affects the application of bank-
ruptcy law. For example, substantial inflation essentially eliminates the value
of assets that are carried on balance sheets at historic cost, unless an inflation
adjustment is made.65 High inflation levels radically distort the banking sys-
tem, and make it difficult if not impossible to carry out lending activities
beyond the shortest term.66 Inflation has eroded the capital base of the banks
in many countries in the region, and has further reduced the market value of
the loans that they can offer.
Another factor in most CEE countries is creditor passivity: creditors
rarely act aggressively to collect the debts owing to them. 67 This is espe-
cially true of creditors that are state-owned enterprises. 68 The lack of aggres-
sive creditor collection efforts results in a lack of motivation for businesses to
63See D&T REPORT, supra note 20, at 37.
6WORLD EcoNoic Ou-LooYC MAY 1995: A SuRVEY BY Tm STAFF OF THE hTRNATioNAL
MoNETrARiY FuND, Table A13 (1995); Deloitte & Touche, Enterprise Restructuring - Ukraine 8 (1996)
(unpublished document on file with the author). In a country with inflation of 4735 percent in one year, a
loaf of bread that cost one monetary unit (eg., one dollar) at the beginning of the year would cost 4735
monetary units (eg., $4,735) at the end of the year.
65The Romanian government has enacted legislation on three occasions since 1990 to provide for
statutory adjustment of balance sheets to reflect inflation. The adjustments have not exactly matched the
level of inflation, however.
6In Ukraine, for example, banks normally -make only short-term loans that do not extend for more
than a month at a time. In addition, most Ukrainian banks are small, and thus are not able to make large
loans.
6HAsHI, supra note 50, at 24-25. There are occasional exceptions, such as the taxing authorities in
Ukraine, who file ninety percent of the bankruptcy cases in that country in an effort to collect unpaid
taxes.6sThe state may lack motivation in pushing creditor collection efforts because it typically wears a
number of hats in an insolvency situation. Where it fails to act diligently as a creditor, for example, it may
benefit directly as a shareholder. Id.
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file bankruptcy cases, because they do not need protection against debt col-
lection efforts. More vigorous creditor collection activity is badly needed in
the CEE countries,69 to reduce the number of loss-making enterprises and to
push forward the privatization process.
III. THE CEE LEGAL SYSTEMS
In addition to distinctive economic features, the CEE countries have legal
systems with distinctive features that impact the operation of bankruptcy
law. There are five such features that merit consideration.
First, all of the CEE countries either fall into the civil law tradition based
on the French and German civil codes, or have decided that they want to
adopt this system. Second, the legal structures underlying the market econo-
mies in the Central European Countries prior to World War II remained
largely intact during the Communist era, but fell into disuse. In contrast, in
the NIS countries there are no traditions of market economies or legal struc-
tures to support them. Third, the judiciary needed to make such a legal
structure function effectively is largely in place, and eager to make a market
economy work. However, the judges badly need training in the principles of
a market economy and the application of the legal concepts necessary for such
a system. Fourth, the other players necessary to make an insolvency or bank-
ruptcy system function effectively are largely missing and need to be identi-
fied and trained for their roles in bankruptcy. Finally, the bankruptcy
systems in the CEE countries are complicated by the fact that banks are
eligible for bankruptcy in most of these countries, and many of the new banks
have systematically made bad loans and have become insolvent.
A. THE CivIL LAW TRADITION
All of the CEE countries have adopted, or plan to adopt, the Continental
Western European civil law tradition, as opposed to the common law system
of the British Isles and the English-speaking nations of the world (including
the United States).
Unlike common law systems, civil law legal systems are dominated by a
civil code, sometimes linked with a separate, but integrally linked, commer-
cial code, which is normally drafted in a single legislative effort.70 These
61Vigorous debt collection practices are not an unqualified virtue. In the Czech Republic, for example,
where bank debt collection was vigorous, the transition to a market economy was promoted by less active
debt collection efforts. Indeed, a number of states in the United States responded to the Great Depression
by enacting mortgage foreclosure moratorium statutes, which postponed the right of mortgage holders to
foreclose after default on debts secured by real property. See, e.g., East New York Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326
U.S. 230 (1945) (upholding eleventh successive annual extension of New York's 1933 mortgage morato-
rium law).
7°JAMEs G. APPLE & ROBERT B. DEYLiNG, A PRR MR ON ThE CrvIL LAW SYsTEm 36 (1995).
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codes provide a reasonably comprehensive system of law for the non-criminal
body of law in such a country. Germany and France provide the two domi-
nant models for civil codes, and civil law countries generally base their civil
codes on one of these models.
Civil codes emphasize form, structure, and the formation of general princi-
ples of law to govern specific situations.71 The reasoning process begins with
general principles found in the code, and proceeds by deductive reasoning to a
particular solution for a given legal problem. 2
Along with a civil code structure that does not exist in the common law
system, the civil law system brings a different approach to lawmaking, case
law and the role of the court in the legal system. The most important differ-
ence between the two types of legal systems is the allocation of power be-
tween the courts and the legislature in a civil law system.73 In a civil law
system, the courts are much more narrowly restricted to interpreting existing
statutes, and have little power to 'make" law:74 for the most part, judicial
precedent has little impact in a civil law system.75 Legislatures in civil law
countries appear to exert a modestly greater degree of care in drafting legisla-
tion than legislatures in common law countries.
Instead of judicial precedent, treatises written by law professors fill the
gaps left by the legislature, and are the principal sources of law to supplement
the legislative texts. Such treatises play a very important role. The function
of treatise writers in the civil law system is to analyze the basic codes and
legislation to formulate general theories and to extract, enumerate, and ex-
pound on the principles of law derived from them.76 From the basic princi-
ples, the treatise writers derive and recommend appropriate results in specific
cases. After legislative texts, treatises are the most important sources of law
in the civil law system.
As a result of the systematic elaboration of law in civil codes and trea-
tises, the reasoning process in the civil law system is different from that in
the common law system. In the civil law system, reasoning is deductive, and
proceeds from the general principles elaborated in the legal sources to the
resolution of a specific problem.77 In the common law tradition, in contrast,
reasoning is frequently inductive from past reported case law, to extract the
711d. at 19.
721d.
73 d. at 34-35.
741d. at 37-38. A notable exception to this rule is found in French tort law, which is largely court-
made. There are only five sections of the French Civil Code devoted to tort law, §§ 1382-1386, plus a
minor amount of supplementary legislation. Unlike most civil code provisions, these provisions are heavily
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legal principles that may be applicable to new cases.78
The foregoing differences bring practical distinctions between the two
legal systems as well. Court structures in the two systems tend to be differ-
ent: common law courts tend to be general jurisdiction courts, while civil law
court systems are frequently specialized, based on the particular code for
which a given court is responsible.7 9 The single-event trial that dominates
the model of common law adjudication is unknown in the civil law system:
cases are decided by the judge (or judges), usually without a jury, after a
series of hearings over a period of time.80 The civil law judge takes a more
active role in questioning witnesses and directing the collection of evidence.8'
While the civil law tradition is quite different from the common law
tradition,82 bankruptcy law is well known in that tradition. Bankruptcy laws
function effectively in every Continental Western European country. While
some of these laws are somewhat similar to the bankruptcy law in the United
States, others are quite different. The importance of the civil law tradition in
the CEE countries appears principally in the details of the bankruptcy laws
and how they function in these countries, in comparison with how they func-
tion in the United States (which is beyond the scope of this Article): in that
effort we must keep in mind the differences between a common law and a
civil law system.
B. STATUTORY STRUCTURES
The extent to which the legal foundations necessary for a market econ-
omy exist in the CEE countries today varies throughout the region. Gener-
ally, the countries fall into two groups: the Central European countries that
had market economies and Western-style legal systems prior to World War II,
and the NIS countries that did not.
1. Central European Countries
Western-style legal systems and market economies existed in the Central
European countries, the tier of countries from Poland south to Bulgaria, prior
to World War II. In these countries, the Western-style legal systems for the
most part remained intact during the communist era. To a substantial extent,
the laws governing the business sector were not repealed; instead, they sim-






8'One must be careful not to overstate the differences between the civil and common law systems.
Particularly in recent decades, there has developed a trend of rapprochement between the two systems. As
a result, the differences are more a matter of degree than in kind between the two systems. See, e.g., Ajani,
supra note 26, at 117.
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begin anew in drafting the laws needed to support a market economy; each of
these countries could begin by dusting off the old laws, which mostly re-
mained in force (even though in most countries they had been out of print for
half a century), or by readopting the old laws that existed before the commu-
nist era.83 While modernization of the laws was needed in many respects, in
each of these countries there was a system in place of Western-style laws and
legal traditions8 4 to support a market economy and the rule of law.
For example, the Romanian Civil Code, translated from the 1804 Napole-
onic Code and enacted in 1862, remains in force today. Similarly, the
Romanian Commercial Code, translated from the 1884 Italian Commercial
Code and enacted in 1887, is also" valid.85 The legislatures in each of the
CEE countries have been active in updating the laws needed to support mod-
em needs.86 However, legislation is far more urgent in the NIS countries,
where there is no such legal structure in place.
In addition, each of the Central European countries has lawyers who are
old enough to remember business law systems during the pre-communist era.
These lawyers are generally in their seventies today. Each of the Central
European countries is relying substantially on these lawyers to help direct it
back to market economies. Generally speaking, market economies and West-
ern-style legal systems were strongest in the northern part of Central Europe,
and were weaker toward the south.
2. NIS Countries
For the NIS countries (formerly part of the Soviet Union), the picture is
very different. Imperial Russia was governed by a czar, rather than by West-
ern-style civil and commercial codes, and the czar in principle owned and
controlled everything.87 While there was some statutory support for com-
merce, it was limited, and the protection of property rights was very weak.88
The traces of non-communist law in the NIS countries are very ephemeral,
because these countries became communist much earlier than the Central
European countries, and all sources of Czarist law were repealed early in the
83In Poland, for example, many business statutes (including the 1934 bankruptcy laws) were repealed
during the communist era. In 1990, Poland readopted the 1934 bankruptcy laws, and these laws govern
bankruptcy in Poland today.
s 4Accord, Sachs, supra note 39, at 445-47 (recognizing legal traditions from pre-communist times in
Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia (now divided into Slovakia and the Czech Republic), and Baltic states).
"5The bankruptcy portion of the Romanian Commercial Code continued in force until it was replaced
by Law 64 of 1995. See CODLILUI Co.iamRcA. §§ 695-971 (1887).
"6In general, bankruptcy law does not frequently need substantial revision. The first permanent
United States bankruptcy law, enacted in 1898, has been revised substantially only twice, in 1938 and in
1978.
87Sachs, supra note 39, at 447.
881d.
1996)
AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY LAW JOURNAL
communist era.8 9 Imperial Russia included all of Ukraine and Belarus, except
for their western fringes (which had been part of the Lithuanian, Polish, and
Austro-Hungarian empires during various historical periods).90
In the NIS countries, the task of creating a market economy and a legal
structure to support it is far more difficult than in the Central European
countries. The NIS countries lack substantial traditions of private enterprise,
and the picture of a market economy in that region is largely a blank canvas.
A substantial portion of the population is still convinced that making a profit
should be a crime, and respect for legal obligations is spotty. There is a vast
education problem: people must learn how a market economy is supposed to
function, and they must come to accept the legal structures that make a mar-
ket economy possible. Until this learning takes place, neither a market econ-
omy nor a system of legal structures on which it is based is likely to take root.
Like the Central European countries, the NIS countries have also decided
to adopt the civil law system as their basic legal structure.9' However, the
basic civil codes are not yet in place, and the judiciary needs much training in
the operation of a civil law system. Much work remains to be done to bring
a Western-style legal system to these countries. Even after it arrives, which
will not likely happen for several years at best, there is likely to be less pre-
dictability in the outcome of particular legal disputes until the judiciary be-
comes accustomed to the civil law system and a market economy.9
2
C. THE JUDICIARY
In a region of weak businesses, poor work ethics and insufficient capital,
the status of the judiciary is one of the brighter spots. For the most part, the
CEE judges are eager to learn Western legal traditions, eager to help in the
development of their own laws, and eager to embrace the rule of law in their
countries.
The increase in sophistication of the CEE judiciary in the last five years
has been dramatic. I taught a Rule of Law seminar (sponsored by the State
Department, the United States Information Agency, USAID and the
Romanian Ministry of Justice) for some sixty Romanian judges in 1991, a
year and a half after the end of the communist era in that country. At that
time, the United States government doubted whether there had been a real
change in the government (because only the top tier of communist leaders
89Ajani, supra note 26, at 97 n. 15.
'Ukraine, in fact, had one of the earliest civil codes, during the era of the Vikings. However, its traces
in the Ukrainian economy disappeared many centuries ago.
91See supra text accompanying notes 70-82.
92Accord, Sachs, supra note 39, at 446.
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had been removed,93 and the rest remained in place).9 4 However, trial level
judges from around the country who attended the seminar (at their own ex-
pense) showed a remarkable commitment to making democracy work. At
that time, however, they had little understanding of what democracy was
about, or what was needed to make it effective. In judicial seminars that I
have taught in Romania in 1996, where the participants have included some
of the same judges, the increase in their sophistication has been quite dra-
matic. Many of them have a knowledge of their laws and a legal sophistica-
tion in the tradition of the rule of law that rivals that of United States
judges.
The luster of the judiciary in Central and Eastern Europe is not alto-
gether untarnished. Some judges retain the attitudes of the old days. They
refuse to make judicial decisions or they blindly follow the recommendations
of prosecutors. Furthermore, the judiciary suffers from low pay scales and
inadequate facilities and support. In most CEE countries, many judges (in-
cluding many of the best and the brightest) are leaving the bench for the
much higher incomes that lawyers now enjoy in those countries.
The status of the judiciary in Romania, to pick an example, is illustrated
in its bankruptcy law 9 5 In revising its bankruptcy law, the Romanian parlia-
ment had to choose someone to hold estate funds in liquidation cases pending
distribution to creditors. Given many decades of corrupt government and a
society dominated by the secret police, there were few public or private play-
ers that the Romanians were willing to trust. The parliament found that the
judiciary enjoyed a much higher level of trust than any other segment of the
business community. In consequence, the parliament gave the syndic judges96
(those judges to whom bankruptcy cases are assigned) responsibility for the
safekeeping of bankruptcy estate funds pending their distribution to
creditors.97
In most CEE countries, bankruptcy cases go to trial courts of more gen-
eral jurisdiction. In the Central European countries, these are generally the
higher level trial courts of general jurisdiction. The syndic judges in
Romania, for example, are Tribunale judges who are given this specific assign-
93In addition, the secret police (securitate) had been disbanded, but the employees remained employed
by the government in other positions.
94
See supra note 3.
9-For a description of the main features of the Romanian bankruptcy system, see Samuel L. Bufford,
Romanian Bankruptcy Law: A Central European Example, 17.1 & 2 N.Y.L. ScaF J. NT'L & CoMP. L.
(1996).
96For a description of the syndic judge position, see id.
97In contrast, in the United States the funds collected on behalf of creditors are kept by a trustee
appointed from the private sector in a Chapter 7 case, and by the debtor-in-possession of the business in a
Chapter 11 case (except in the rare instance where a trustee has been appointed). See 11 U.S.C. §§ 704,
1107(a) (1994).
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ment as part of their judicial duties. Slovakia, in contrast, has specialized
courts that handle only bankruptcy cases, and fourteen judges are assigned to
these courts. In addition, bankruptcy cases in Poland go to the commercial
courts, and in Warsaw there is a specialized bankruptcy section of the com-
mercial court (and at least one judge who handles only bankruptcy cases). In
the NIS countries there is a separate system of arbitration courts that have
jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. These courts arose during the Soviet era
to resolve disputes between state-owned entities, and thus have some experi-
ence and sophistication in commercial matters.98
Although eager and capable, the judiciary in the CEE countries is gener-
ally inexperienced in business matters. This is somewhat less true for the
arbitration courts. This lack of experience is likely to lead to unpredictable
results until the judiciary becomes knowledgeable in handling bankruptcy
cases and business matters generally. Judicial supervision of bankruptcy cases
involves unique skills not normally employed in other litigation.99 A bank-
ruptcy judge, for example, must be able to review and value the business
prospects of an enterprise and to determine whether it has a reasonable possi-
bility of reorganization. The judge must be able to ride herd on inexperienced
administrators and liquidators, and to make sure that a bankruptcy case pro-
ceeds in an orderly fashion to conclusion and distribution of assets to credi-
tors. These are new skills that even experienced judges lack in the CEE
countries. Training is needed to prepare the CEE judges for these new
responsibilities.
D. THE BANKRUPTCY PLAYERS
In addition to a well-functioning judiciary, a bankruptcy system depends
on the participation of other players, who are either absent or inexperienced
in the CEE countries. 100 Attorneys with bankruptcy experience are needed:
more than any other players, they are the ones who make a bankruptcy sys-
tem function, by directing their clients toward effective resolution of their
cases. Auctioneers are needed to assist in the sale of assets, and markets are
needed where auction sales can take place. Investment bankers may also be
needed.
Under the British system, insolvency cases are managed by accountants,
rather than by trustees, as in the United States. The major international
accounting firms are busy trying to stake out a similar role for themselves in
the CEE countries, with a certain measure of success. They are bringing in
9 Such courts existed during the communist era in the Central European countries also, but the courts
were unified a number of years ago in most of these countries, and the arbitration courts ceased to exist. A
similar unification is now under discussion in Ukraine.
99Clark, supra note 56, at 36.1"0See, e.g., Horton, supra note 40, at 31 (Russia).
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personnel with insolvency experience from Britain and other Commonwealth
countries, and are beginning to fill this niche in the bankruptcy system.' 0 '
Deloitte & Touche, for example, has had its accountants appointed as trustees
in a number of large bankruptcy cases in Hungary, and in the liquidation of
Latvia's largest bank. However, local experts in administering insolvent es-
tates will have to be developed.10
2
Because the CEE countries are (or want to be) civil law countries, they
also need law professors to write treatises and commentaries on bankruptcy
law.10 3 Such commentaries are beginning to develop in the CEE region.' 04
E. BANKS iN B,.aKRupTcY
Banks are generally included in the bankruptcy system in the CEE coun-
tries. There is no separate insolvency system for banking or insurance enter-
prises, such as in the United States. There have been few insurance
insolvencies, because the insurance industry is even more undeveloped in the
CEE countries than the banking system. However, banks have failed and
gone into bankruptcy, and this has posed political as well as legal problems.105
None of the bankruptcy laws in the CEE countries except Latvia has any
special provisions for bank insolvencies. In addition, in most CEE countries
there is no system of deposit insurance, such as that which exists in the
United States. Thus, in every bank insolvency, a question is posed as to how
the depositors are to be protected. If deposits are not protected, this can lead
to a lack of confidence in the banking system, and deposits will quickly dry
up. For the most part, however, the public treasury is the only available
source of depositor protection, given the absence of deposit insurance.' 06
Banks belong in the bankruptcy system. The United States system of
providing a governmental liquidation system for the savings and loan insol-
vencies has proved extremely costly: it has already cost United States citi-
zens approximately $130 billion for the insolvencies in the savings and loan
entities that failed in the 1980s,10 7 and may eventually cost as much as $480
l'Schiffinan, supra note 19, at 12.
1 2It is not conceivable that the CEE countries will permit foreign accountants to dominate this aspect
(or any other) of the bankruptcy business.
103For the importance of commentary by law professors in a civil law system, see supra text accompa-
nying note 76.
104See, eg., TuRcu, supra note 19 (text on Romanian bankruptcy law). Professor Turcu is both a law
professor and a court of appeals judge in Cluj, Romania.
O°5See, e.g., Metzger & Bufford, supra note 1, at 157. In July 1996, Romania moved to close three
banks, including Dacia Felix Bank, which at one time held ten percent of all the banking deposits in the
country. This raised a substantial political crisis for the banking industry.
'
06
1n Hungary, for example, the government covered the deposits for the first two large banks that
failed in 1992. However, when a third large bank failed, the government refused to cover all of the
deposits. This decision was very controversial.
0 7David G. Savage, High Court Says U.S. Reneged on S&Ls, Must Pay, Los ANceLEs TzAes, July 2,
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billion.18s Much of this expense could have been saved if banking institutions
had been liquidated in the bankruptcy system, where trained and experienced
liquidators could have accomplished the task at a small fraction of the cost.
However, special provisions are needed in a bankruptcy code to handle bank-
ing insolvencies. Such provisions would be parallel to those that are in place
for stock brokerage firms in the United States. 0 9 In addition, a government
agency is needed, similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Agency, which
administered insolvent banks in the United States before the Resolution
Trust Corporation was established. No such statutory provisions have yet
appeared in any of the CEE countries except Latvia.
CONCLUSION
The rapid development of bankruptcy law in the formerly communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe places bankruptcy in the lead in the
development of legal structures needed for the support of market economies
in those countries. However, there are features of both the legal systems and
the economic systems in these countries that provide challenges for the imple-
mentation of bankruptcy law, and that lead it to take on a different color
from what we are accustomed to in the United States. The most important
difference is the privatization of state-owned enterprises, and the unique role
that bankruptcy law has in that effort.
The economies in the CEE countries have distinctive features that affect
the functioning of bankruptcy law in these countries. Privatization is in its
beginning stages in most of the countries, and many of the state-owned busi-
nesses are insolvent. Because no business was allowed to fail under the com-
munist governments, the lands are full of economic dinosaurs that should be
extinct. While markets are generally available in the United States for most
assets that need to be liquidated, so that they can be sold by a bankruptcy
estate at a price approximating their value in the marketplace, such markets
are much less common in the CEE countries. For many kinds of assets in
those countries, there are no recognized or readily available markets, and it is
far more difficult to sell assets or to determine their fair market value. There
are a number of differences in the competitive environment in the CEE coun-
tries, which include relatively much larger enterprises with larger impacts
from their failure, high inflation, and routine government bailouts for loss-
making enterprises. In addition, the larger business enterprises are encum-
1996, at Al; Robert A. Rosenblatt, GAO Estrates Final Cost of S&L Bailout at $480.9 Billion, Los
ANGcL E TnmEs, July 13, 1996, at Di.
'0 8Rosenblatt, supra note 107, at D1.
01 9See 11 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (stockbrokers), §§ 761-66 (commodity brokers) (1994).
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bered with "social assets" that provide benefits at company cost that are
normally provided by governments in the Western world.
The legal context is also different because each of these countries is (or
plans to be) a civil law country, as opposed to a common law country. One
of the principal differences that this invokes is that courts are somewhat less
powerful in the legal system than are common law courts. For the non-NIS
countries, there are systems of laws in place to support a market economy,
but they need modernization. For the NIS countries, in contrast, there are no
such systems of laws in place and no traditions of market economies or the
rule of law: these countries must start at the beginning in forming Western
style legal systems. However, the judiciary in the CEE countries is for the
most part bright and eager to implement the legal changes necessary to sup-
port a market economy. Nonetheless, the judges for the most part know
rather little about how such an economy is supposed to function, and need a
substantial measure of educational assistance. Further, for the effective func-
tioning of a bankruptcy system, the other bankruptcy players need to be iden-
tified and trained in the operation of a bankruptcy system. Finally, the
bankruptcy systems that are developing in the CEE countries are compli-
cated by the fact that banks are eligible for bankruptcy, and insolvent banks
are going into bankruptcy.
As an increasing number of bankruptcy professionals, including judges,
attorneys, and trustees are providing advice and assistance to the CEE coun-
tries and other developing countries around the world with respect to bank-
ruptcy law and practice, it is important to keep in mind these differences
between the legal and economic systems in the United States and those in
these countries. Attention to these differences is necessary to make a contri-
bution to the development of bankruptcy law in other parts of the world
where the legal traditions, economic systems, and state of economic develop-
ment are different from our own.
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